American Bar Association Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice:  Standards Relating to Trial by Jury (Approved Draft) by Belli, Melvin M.
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 68 Issue 3 
1970 
American Bar Association Project on Minimum Standards for 
Criminal Justice: Standards Relating to Trial by Jury (Approved 
Draft) 
Melvin M. Belli 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Courts Commons, and the Criminal Procedure Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Melvin M. Belli, American Bar Association Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice: Standards 
Relating to Trial by Jury (Approved Draft), 68 MICH. L. REV. 614 (1970). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol68/iss3/6 
 
This Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law 
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor 
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
RECENT BOOKS 
BooK REvmws 
AMERICAN BAR AssOCIATION PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS 
FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: STANDARDS RELATING TO TRIAL BY JURY 
(APPROVED DRAFT). Recommended by the Advisory Committee on 
the Criminal Trial. New York: Institute of Judicial Administra-
tion. 1968. Pp. xii, 180. Paper, $2. 
Standards Relating to Trial by Jury is one of a series of tentative 
reports being prepared on a variety of topics by advisory committees 
of the American Bar Association project on minimum standards for 
criminal justice. That project grew out of a proposal, made in 1963 
by the Institute of Judicial Administration at New York University 
Law School, that the ABA undertake to formulate such standards. 
On the basis of the report of a pilot study committee, the ABA, at 
its annual meeting in August of 1964, authorized the project for 
three years with a budget of 750,000 dollars. The project has dealt 
with the entire spectrum of the administration of criminal justice, 
including the functions performed by law enforcement officers, by 
prosecutors, and by defense counsel, and the procedures to be fol-
lowed in the pretrial, trial, sentencing, and review stages. The 
titles of the committees indicate the broad scope of the project: 
"Police Function," "Pretrial Proceedings," "Prosecution and De-
fense Functions," "Criminal Trial," and "Sentencing and Review." 
A separate advisory committee was created to deal with the subject 
of fair trial and free press.1 
The Committee on Criminal Trial published the report on 
trial by jury, and almost 8,000 copies of that report are being dis-
tributed within the American Bar Association. Thus adequate 
opportunity is being provided for the expression of divergent views, 
and for the closing of "loopholes." Certainly much more time is 
being offered for consideration than is given any particular piece 
of legislation in state legislatures or in the national Congress. 
Let us see what Trial by Jury has done. First, I suppose, we 
should consider whether we want a uniform standard for criminal 
justice across the United States. We certainly have not got one in 
morals and ethics, as is evidenced by Nevada's gambling and openly 
run houses of prostitution. Each state has its o,vn idiosyncracies, 
which either are arbitrarily based upon the authority of antiquity 
or else purposefully exist to satisfy a particular cultural need. I 
suppose we should have general uniformity in criminal procedure, 
but there should definitely be provisions for certain exceptional 
I. See also Newman, Book Review, 66 MICH. L. REv. 1058 (1968). 
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situations that are related to particular local cultures. I find that 
very few, if any, of the broad general recommendations in the jury 
trial project offend local custom, although a few of those recom-
mendations mildly affront my sense of due process.2 
At the outset, the report discusses the scope of the right to jury 
trial and indicates that it is unsettled whether the Federal Consti-
tution requires trial by jury in every criminal proceeding. Duncan 
v. Louisiana,3 however, is cited as support for the proposition that 
the Constitution does not guarantee the right of jury trial to defen-
dants charged with petty offenses. The recommended standard pro-
vides for jury trial in all instances except those involving petty 
offenses, and in those instances, it hedges a possible lack of due 
process-and therefore, justice-with a suggestion that defendants 
be granted a right of appeal. 
The report's recommended procedures for jury trial with less 
than twelve jurors and for conviction upon less than a unanimous 
verdict might be useful in trials involving petty crimes. In this 
connection, it is noted that "at any time before a verdict, the parties 
with the approval of the court may stipulate that the jury shall 
consist of any number less than that required for a full jury" (p. 8). 
Of course, the use of a jury numbering less than twelve should be 
distinguished from permitting conviction on less than a unanimous 
verdict. I like a jury of twelve; I like the unanimous verdict. I know 
that England, the "home of the jury" (which really it is not), now 
has juries with less than twelve members and allows convictions 
upon less than unanimous verdicts in criminal cases. Those innova-
tions seem to be working in the land where the principles of Esco-
bedo, Gideon, and Miranda were the order of the day long before 
they became watchwords of American constitutional dogma. The 
advisory committee for this report concluded that the minimum 
standards should recognize the propriety of less than unanimous 
verdicts, such as are now permitted in six states. This conclusion 
was "bolstered by the fact that these standards disapprove of the 
continued use of the Allen or 'dynamite' charge as a means of in-
fluencing minority jurors to change their position" (p. 28). 
Indeed, I believe that the giving of the "dynamite charge" in 
any context in no way accords with due process. Such coercion of 
the jury is deadly in this country where jurors are not in the habit 
of "standing up to trial judges" as I have seen them do in England. I 
think the "dynamite charge" is as devastating to due process as is a 
2. See, e.g., text following note 6 infra, text accompanying notes 8 and 11 infra, 
and p. 620 infra. 
3. 391 U.S. 145 (1968). 
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judge's comment on the evidence or his comment on the failure 
of the defendant to testify.4 
It is recommended that the jury trial may be knowledgeably 
waived. I offer no criticism here. The commentary in this section 
of the report is authoritative, learned, and extremely objective. 
The problem of selecting the venire-the prospective jurors-
is adequately treated. And I think I know something about that 
problem since I had the pleasure of testifying before Senator 
Tydings' Committee on Federal Jury Reform. Under the old federal 
system, "key men" picked jurors. I thought that this "loaded" 
method of jury selection was horrendous in the federal courts. It 
provided for the selection of a blue-ribbon jury, hand-picked by 
the key man. That system, however, has now been changed. 
The report recommends that questionnaires be used to screen 
prospective jurors. I disagree. Trial jurors should be qualified in 
the same manner as those who vote for governor and President. 
If they have the capacity to vote for chief executives, they should 
have the capacity to vote on an individual's guilt or innocence. 
Certainly, I do not want unlettered dunderheads on my juries, 
particularly when I am engaged in a complicated criminal case 
such as one involving fraud or involving a tax law or securities law 
violation. But neither do I want all accountants or people who have 
passed intelligence tests or history tests or people who come only 
from the "educated" side of the tracks. I have seen jury commis-
sioners use such questionnaires and examinations deliberately to 
weed out jurors favorable to the plaintiff on the civil side and jurors 
who might vote for the defendant on the criminal side. I just do 
not believe that intelligence or historical knowledge is a necessary 
attribute for those whose function it is to mete out justice. 
In regard to the selection of the jury panel and the voir dire 
examination, there is dispute as to whether trial counsel should be 
permitted to direct individual questions to prospective jurors. I be-
lieve that such questions should be allowed and that they should be 
oral and direct rather than made in ·writing through the court. 
Competent and resourceful trial counsel can pick a jury as intelli-
gently and as expeditiously as can the trial judge, who in many cases 
has never had trial experience as a practitioner. I feel that any 
person whom I defend has hired me-and not the trial judge-to 
represent his interests. I feel that I, as well as the opposing counsel, 
should have this opportunity-besides those provided by the 
opening statement and argument-for intimate contact with the 
jury. Counsel who abuse the privilege of direct interrogation during 
voir dire may be penalized by the nisi prius judge. But the fact 
4. Both of the latter procedures are apparently unconstitutional. See Griffin v. 
California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965). 
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that some attorneys abuse that privilege does not justify denying 
it to those who conduct voir dire examinations with propriety. 
The recommended standards for peremptory challenges in crim-
inal cases are inadequate.The report suggests that ten peremptory 
challenges be allowed when the offense is punishable by death or 
life imprisonment, that six be granted if the offense is some other 
felony, and that three be allowed if the offense is a misdemeanor. 
Those are too few. I would at least double the number in each 
category.6 At common law, a defendant on the criminal side was 
entitled to thirty-five peremptory challenges-more than most states 
allow at the present time. The report notes that New York permits 
a large number of challenges, but it suggests that this may be "ex-
plained in part by the fact that no additional challenges are made 
available when there are additional defendants joined for trial" 
(p. 72). I would certainly allow additional challenges in the per-
plexing and confusing cases involving numerous defendants, par-
ticularly when-as often is the case-conflicts of interest appear.6 
The committee apparently condones the practice found in some 
jurisdictions, which requires parties to exercise peremptory chal-
lenges as each juror is individually selected. I disagree as to both 
the effectiveness and the justice of this procedure. I would first 
seat the entire jury and then call upon counsel to exercise his 
peremptories. I favor this approach because the jury is a body of 
twelve persons, not two, six, or eight. The over-all complexion of 
the panel may provide a reason for challenging certain jurors who 
appeared to be acceptable when first seated. 
With respect to striking the challenged jurors, many trial counsel 
prefer that this process be done secretly, but I believe that I have 
been able to do it inoffensively in open court. My usual practice 
is to rise and very briefly to thank and excuse the juror by name. 
The panel, being informed of the nature of the peremptory chal-
lenge, does not take offense-at least, that is my feeling.7 
The report considers the use of juror handbooks. I think that 
those handbooks are completely out of place in an adversary judicial 
proceeding. They just cannot be made objective, and yet they be-
come as authoritative and influential as the perplexing jury instruc-
tion. 8 I am against any kind of jury handbooks, as I would be against 
5. It should be noted that most states have too few peremptory challenges on the 
civil side as well. 
6, See People v. Aranda, 63 Cal. 2d 518, 407 P .2d 265 (1965), which seems to pro-
hibit joint trials in conspiracy cases when the problem of accusatory statements might 
arise. 
7. Of course, I could be completely wrong. It is my experience that the more 
"adept" one becomes at picking juries, the more he realizes how little he has learned. 
8. See p. 619 infra. 
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sending jurors to special schools. Jury handbooks and schools are 
nothing more than sophisticated methods of thought control. 
The report condemns the old procedure of bringing defendants 
into the presence of the jury in prison garb or chains. Under the 
suggested standards the defendant is not only entitled to an instruc-
tion that he is "presumed to be innocent," but he must also have 
the physical appearance of one who is innocent. The report also 
considers the perplexing problem that the violent courtroom con-
duct of a defendant who insists upon being present may cause the 
jury to be prejudiced against him. But the possible prejudicial 
effects of such behavior apparently are not considered sufficient to 
render the jury incapable of delivering a fair and impartial verdict, 
as long as the judge instructs the jury to disregard the defendant's 
conduct in arriving at their verdict. Thus the report suggests that 
if appropriate instructions are given, the jury should be permitted 
to hear and decide a case even if they have witnessed the defendant's 
violent courtroom display. The use of a soundproof glass cage 
might prove helpful in minimizing prejudice against unruly defen-
dants9 but it is neither specifically recommended nor specifically 
ruled out. Despite the high cost of such a piece of equipment, its 
use would seem to be preferable to the more barbaric practices of 
some contemporary courts, such as that employed in the recent 
Chicago riot conspiracy case in which the judge ordered an unruly 
defendant to be physically bound and gagged.10 
The report also recommends that jurors be permitted to take 
notes during the trial, "regarding the evidence presented to them 
and [to] keep these notes with them when they retire £or their 
deliberation" (p. 11). While I doubt that a juror's notes can have 
anything like the completeness and accuracy of the court reporter's 
transcript, nevertheless note-taking may trigger a juror's memory 
and focus his attention on pertinent facts. Thus, it may have the 
effect of improving the quality of his decisions. But the trial judge 
should be particularly careful to point out that if a juror has any 
doubt about the meaning or accuracy of his notes, he should ask 
that the record be read. 
The recommendations include a provision which would permit 
the substitution of a judge if that judge certifies that he has "famil-
iarized" himself with the record of the trial. I disagree. There are 
few, if any, cases in which it is necessary to substitute a judge.11 
I would rather have a day or two break in the trial until a sick judge 
9. Such cages were used to enclose the defendants at trial in the Eichmann and 
Sirhan cases. 
10. N.Y. Times, Oct. 30, 1969, at I, col. 2. 
11. In the relatively few cases in which the judge dies or becomes permanently 
disabled, a new trial may be granted. 
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returns than risk the possibility of having a completely different 
personality guide the destinies of my client. The requirement that 
the substitute judge need only certify his familiarity with the case 
in order to qualify is insufficient to guarantee fairness to the parties 
involved in the litigation. There is too much insight to be gained 
by actually seeing and listening to the witnesses at trial-and too 
much judicial discretion in the final judgment-not to make such 
insight determinative of the outcome of the case. 
In most jurisdictions, jury instructions are virtually incompre-
hensible to the average juror. Trial by Jury suggests nothing to 
clarify them and perhaps there is nothing that can be done. The 
difficulty may lie in the very nature of the subject; the instruction 
attempts the all-but-impossible task of conveying in a brief but suc-
cinct manner the meaning of technical and often confusing points of 
law to a small group of persons who lack legal expertise. Some 
states, through bar associations and judicial committees, have pro-
vided uniform books of jury instructions. The textual portions of 
these books are excellent, but the instructions themselves are pon-
derously unintelligible and in the best tradition of the garbled 
prose of the Ia-wyer. I defy any juror, after listening to some of these 
instructions, to explain them intelligently either to a fellow juror 
or even to himself. 
Frankly, I do not have a solution to the problem of unintelligible 
jury instructions, but I do believe that there are other methods of 
apprising the jury of the law that are at least as effective as the 
traditional statement from the bench. I tried a criminal case in 
Indiana not long ago-a delightful piece of alleged sodomy by a 
doctor. I learned that in criminal cases in Indiana, counsel argues 
law as well as facts to the jury and may tell the jury to take the law 
from any "reasonable source," including his own argument. Maybe 
with all the adept lawyers on television (present company excepted), 
such as Mr. Mason and Mr. Judd, jurors should be allowed to take 
their law from any "readily available source" rather than only from 
the courts. The modern American juror pretty well knows what 
the law is anyway, and with a wide-open voir dire, opening state-
ment, and argument, perhaps little harm would be done if the judge 
did not instruct at all, but instead put each attorney upon his honor 
not to misquote the law. 
In any case, the recommendations in Trial by Jury are confined 
to the traditional form of jury instructions in which the judge 
summarizes the relevant points of law. In particular, the recom-
mended standards stipulate that instructions must be discussed with 
counsel prior to delivery. This requirement promotes justice by 
avoiding unfair surprise to an attorney who might otherwise rely 
on a particular aspect of the law that is not going to be mentioned 
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by the court. In addition, the report suggests that the jury be per-
mitted to take the actual ·written charge to the jury room. I am 
apprehensive about this procedure; it may increase the likelihood 
that the jury will place undue emphasis on a particular instruction. 
I think that a better procedure would be for the judge, having, in 
the first place, kept the instructions to a minimum, to suggest to the 
jury that they come back into the courtroom to have any unclear 
instructions explained. If the jury returns asking for clarification, 
the trial judge should call both counsel into his chambers for as-
sistance and, on the transcript, determine what help should be 
given the jury. 
With regard to the problem of the deadlocked jury, the sugges-
tions of the study are appropriately directed more to the concern for 
ultimate justice than to the need for expediency in reaching a 
verdict. The "dynamite charge" is disavowed. The report also 
suggests that before the jury retires for deliberation the court may 
give warning instructions on consulting, unanimity, surrendering 
honest convictions, and other facets of the jury's actual deliberative 
process. I would prefer a suggestion that these admonitions must 
be given in every case. 
The report recommends that in some cases the individual jurors 
be polled after the jury has returned with the verdict. I would 
suggest that this polling be permitted upon the court's own motion 
in every case. I agree that, "while it is appropriate for the court to 
thank jurors at the conclusion of a trial for their public service, 
such comments should not include praise or criticism of their ver-
dict" (p. 16). Such neutrality is the best guarantee of objectivity 
in all verdicts-at the risk, perhaps, of allowing the exceptional 
errant verdict to pass without notice. 
Trial by Jury provides for the impeachment, on the basis of 
extrajudicial evidence, of a verdict that is shown to be dishonest or 
coerced. The report also suggests that jurors' affidavits be used in 
such cases, but it gives no consideration to the manner in which the 
affidavits are to be taken. The American Bar Association and other 
bar associations have for years suggested that it is unethical for the 
trial lawyer to seek out a juror after a verdict has been reached in 
order to discuss his verdict with him. Indeed, I think that the ideal 
procedure would be for the jurors to return their verdict and then 
to depart from the courtroom keeping their deliberations forever 
unrevealed. If there is to be a provision for the impeachment of 
verdicts, however, it seems that there must be some procedure by 
which jurors may be questioned about their decisions. Moreover, if 
the right to impeach an improperly arrived-at verdict is thought to 
be an integral part of due process-as seems to be implicit in the 
report's recommendations-then the judge should perhaps be re-
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quired to instruct the jurors to talk with the lawyers on each side 
of the case. In fact, an admonition that they do not have to do so 
would, under this view, be a denial of due process to the defendant. 
Such a result seems at best undesirable. 
Frankly, I do not know how the need for secrecy and privacy 
in jury deliberations can be balanced with the right to impeach 
an improper verdict. In any case, I personally will remain hesitant 
to talk with jurors after they have announced their verdict; my 
ego has been shattered too many times when I have spoken to jurors 
after a trial and discovered that they found for my client on the 
basis of a point which I had thought minor or, worse still, one that 
I had not thought of at all. 
On the whole, Trial by Jury is a worthwhile, objective report 
that is well worth the time and money which has been invested in 
it. 
Melvin M. Belli, 
Member of the California Bar 
